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

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BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN WAR

EUNICE M. NDONGA
University of Nairobi
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
eunice.ndonga@yahoo.com

Abstract

The southern Sudan war was caused by a multiplicity of factors ranging from religion intolerance, economic agendas from the Khartoum government and outsiders, globalization as well as local ethnicity. The effects of the war have been not only sociological; they have also been physical and as economic. In relation to this, the social fabric has been torn, education halted and healthcare abandoned. Women, men and children have been killed, detained, mutilated and raped. The war has led to the loss of live hood and increased poverty. Finally, this chapter notes that the girl child has been mostly affected by the war due to their vulnerability as a disintegrated society affords them no protection. The research was purely qualitative. Desktop literature review was conducted. Critical analysis of the literature was conducted.

Key words: *Factors, civil war, Southern Sudan*

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the history of the war in southern Sudan. In this section, the terms war and conflict are used interchangeably. Also in this paper, the Southern Sudan war is introduced and the factors leading to its outbreak and perpetuation substantiated. Finally, the impact of the war on women and girls and the policy implications of the effect of the war will be espoused.

2. Causes and factors exacerbating wars in Southern Sudan

Over the past decade, a worrying trend has emerged in the relationship between economics and armed conflict in Southern Sudan. This trend appears to have two dimensions. First, valuable resources that are of economic value have been used to finance the civil war in Sudan, such as to purchase arms, ammunition and military assistance. For example, several companies were granted oil mining concessions by the Sudanese government in exchange for arms and ammunition. In many cases, such as the case of Sudan, valuable resources, which would have been critical to rebuilding the country in the aftermath of the war, have been used to barter for weapons. Second, a successful outcome of a war is no longer perceived as being the sole means for achieving economic benefits. Rather it has been argued that the

perpetuation of war in certain African countries has become an alternative way of generating profits.[1]

It has been alleged that where economic privileges and assets have been acquired in an armed conflict, either from control of the state or secured through illegal means, parties to the conflict tend to acquire vested interests in prolonging the conflict.[2] The reason is that peace, democracy and accountability for human rights abuses could seriously undermine wartime economic interests. War profiteering is not a new phenomenon in Sudan and external institutions and countries do benefit from the sale of arms to the government of South Sudan as well as the SPLM/A. However, it has been argued that the extent to which commercial agendas are driving or perpetuating current violent conflict in Africa, and the profits that are being derived from these activities, are unprecedented. Critically, these economic agendas provide significant obstacles to the resolution of many conflicts and will prevent sustainable processes of peacemaking and peace-building from being achieved.[3]

2.1 Economic Agendas

An agenda is a plan or program, which is a phenomenon that has a distinct aim or motive. Hence, an economic agenda entails a plan or intention to derive financial benefits from a particular situation.[4] In a war, economic agendas can be divided into two broad categories, namely economic agendas that are related to the causes of war, and economic agendas that contribute to the perpetuation of war. There is no clear boundary between these two categories as there can be a degree of overlap, particularly with respect to greed.[5]

In terms of the first category, the Sudan war emerged out of attempts by political communities to improve their material well-being. Historically, many military campaigns have been launched in order to acquire valuable natural resources and/or strategic trading points. Examples include Spain's conquest of the Americas and various wars during the critical era of state formation in Europe, namely between the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. In addition, economic grievances, such as socio-economic deprivation, and inequitable distribution of resources by the state amongst its citizens, can contribute to the outbreak of war. The Government of Sudan has perpetuated the existing socio-economic deprivation which was started by the colonialists. In addition, the Government of Sudan has been involved in the transfer of wealth from the South to the North and also to the pockets of a few as oil proceeds generated from the South are used pockets by the Government. Such an economic

[1] Ibid
[2] David Keen, 1998. "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars", Adelphi Paper 320, (London International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 15-17. An updated version of this publication is titled "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence" and appears in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42
[3] Op cit
[4] Shannon Field, 2000. "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry", Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Occasional Paper No.23, (Braamfontein: IGD).

[5] Ibid

grievance was fundamental enough to cause the out break of the Sudan war. This was also the case with the French and Russian revolutions, as well as many of the wars of national liberation in Africa.[6]

In terms of the second category, wars can be perpetuated due to the presence of key individuals or groups who derive economic benefits from the war that would be negatively affected should the war be peacefully resolved. Consequently many of these individuals and groups devise and implement plans to prolong armed conflicts. These profit-making activities tend to be driven by greed and generally involve the exploitation of mineral rich areas, usually diamonds and oil, and commercial ventures such as weapons trafficking. Again, various international companies profit from dumping their goods in Sudan as the markets are distorted due to war. The Sudan war is responsible for high prices of basic commodities and firms trading in these basic commodities exploit this opportunity by reaping huge profits from the sale of goods. It can also be argued that the black market in Sudan is a multibillion dollar industry. David Keen, one of the only authors to provide a detailed definition of an economic agenda, interprets this phenomenon more broadly by claiming that the following seven categories constitute economic agendas[7]. In Sudan, controlling or monopolizing trade has been an important component of the civil wars, where 'forced markets', rather than market forces, may determine the demand and supply of resources. War in Sudan causes price increases of certain commodities, and may make it easier to threaten or constrain trading rivals. Officials in Sudan do profit by allowing government restrictions or sanctions on wartime trading to be breached; conflict may make it easier for warlords to avoid paying government taxes.[8]

Another cause of war in Sudan is related to Land and Natural Resources. Conflict may depopulate large areas, allowing armed groups to claim land, water and mineral resources. Mineral rich areas are often intentionally targeted by armed forces for this very reason.[9] A perfect example was observed in Kenya in the period immediately after the marred December 2007 General elections. Politico-ethnic induced conflict led to the internal displacement of over 300,000 people from their lands and homes. This was a perfect opportunity for the SDLF militants and other warlike establishments to occupy lands for the displaced. The government of Sudan has also use helicopters and gunships to displace the Southerners who live in oil rich areas so that the Government can take possession.

It can also be argued from the history of Sudan war that Looting and Pillaging was a major cause of war in Southern Sudan. In many situations of the violent conflict, sections of the government's armed forces often looted and pillaged villages and towns in order to

[6] William Reno, 2000. "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars, in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 43-68

[7] David Keen, 1998. "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars", Adelphi Paper 320, (London International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 15-17. An updated version of this publication is titled "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence" and appears in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42

[8] Global Witness, 1999. A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, (London: Global Witness Ltd.).

[9] Shannon Field, 2000. "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry", Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Occasional Paper No.23, (Braamfontein: IGD).

supplement military wages, which often are not paid by the government. The Rebel groups (SPLM/A) often engaged in similar activities in order to obtain supplies and money to purchase weapons.[10]

However, as Keen[11] defines economic agendas broadly, he neglects to distinguish between actual economic agendas, namely planned or intended actions, and opportunistic spin-offs of armed conflicts. For example, looting/pillaging, protection money and theft of aid supplies are rent-seeking activities, but in most conflict situations they do not constitute a significant agenda or motive that would obstruct the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts.

Mark Duffield [12]analyses the relationship between globalisation and protracted civil wars in developing countries, and provides a sound analysis of war economies. Duffield argues that globalisation has not contributed to civil war in a significant way, but has led to increased disparity and instability in the developing world, as well as the expansion and penetration of all forms of transborder activity, particularly, highly criminalized war economies. As war economies are dependent on external markets, Duffield argues market regulation could potentially be a useful conflict resolution tool. Duffield calls for more research to be undertaken in this regard. The researcher agrees with Duffield and points out that the Sudan war would have been quashed had it not been for globalization and the external markets support of the Government of Southern Sudan. It is important to note that, had market regulation been effected by global economies possibly through economic sanctions and boycotting of products from Sudan, the Government of Sudan as well as the rebel group SPLM would not have accessed financial resources to continue the war.

According to Nathan[13], in African countries the risk of violence increases when poor socio-economic conditions suddenly deteriorate even more; when government is corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of its people; and when poverty and unemployment are linked to an inequitable distribution of wealth.[14]This can be said of being the case on Sudan.

A number of rebellions have been initiated and/or sponsored by foreign governments. Indra de Soysa[15], who draws on Paul Collier[16] extensively, examines the links between the scarcity of

[10] Human Rights Watch. 1999. The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities (New York: Human Rights Watch).
[11] David Keen, 1998. "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars", Adelphi Paper 320, (London International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 15-17. An updated version of this publication is titled "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence" and appears in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42
[12] Mark Duffiled, 2000. "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 69-90
[13] Laurie Nathan, 2000. "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa", Peace and Change, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 190-192.
[14] Laurie Nathan, 2000. "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa", Peace and Change, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 190-192.
[15] Indra de Soysa, 2000. "Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie of Honey Pot?", presented at conference on the economics of political violence, Princeton University, 18-19 March 2000; Indra de Soysa, 2000. "The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?" in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 113-136..
[16] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2000. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", presented at conference on the economics of political violence, Princeton University, 18-19 March 2000

natural resources and civil conflict by utilizing World Bank estimates of natural capital stock per capita for sixty-four countries. Essentially, de Soysa seeks to challenge the position that natural resource scarcity drives conflict. The results of de Soysa's analysis suggest that the abundance of renewable resources among poor countries is more likely to lead to violence and to lower economic, human, and institutional development. De Soysa further claims that the abundance of non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development. According to De Soysa, the results support the argument that armed conflict is often driven by greed-motivated factors rather than grievance factors.

This argument is relevant to the causes of the Sudan war. The author wishes to point out and agree with De soysa that the Sudan war was driven by greed rather by grievance as Sudan is endowed with huge oil deposits. It may also fetch to note that the Nuba mountains are agriculturally rich and the River Nile passes through Sudan vast territory.

2.2 Human Rights Issues

The literature that focuses on human rights issues exposes alleged human rights abuses as a consequence of civil wars. The relationship between war and economic agendas is discussed within this context. Many of the publications provide policy recommendations. Examples include country or issue specific reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the US Department of State.[17] In the case of Sudan, Amnesty International report that "[t]ens of thousands of people have been terrorized into leaving their homes in Western Upper Nile since early 1999. Government forces have used ground attacks, helicopter gunship and indiscriminate high-altitude bombardment to clear the local population from oil-rich areas." [18]

In the case of Sudan it has been argued that foreign currency earned from oil exports has provided the government with the means to continue fighting a war against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement[19]. It has been alleged that the increase in oil exports was due to the revival of Sudan's oil industry through the Greater Nile Oil Project, which is dominated by foreign oil companies. The biggest players in this initiative are the China National Petroleum Company, Petronas Carigali (Malaysia) and Talisman Energy (Canada). The Sudanese government has implemented divide and rule strategies, initiated the forced removal of communities, and allegedly committed gross human rights violations, all in an attempt to

[17] See Human Rights Watch, 1994. Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections, (New York: Human Rights Watch); Human Rights Watch, 1999. Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, (New York: Human Rights Watch); Human Rights Watch World Reports 1998 and 1999 (http://www.hrw.org); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; U.S. Department of State, 2000. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report) - see reports on Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan

[18] Amnesty International 2000. Sudan: The Human Price of Oil. (http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/AFR/15400100.htm)

[19] Ibid

consolidate its control over oil resources. This has had the effect of exacerbating the armed conflict. [20]

2.3 History of the war in Sudan

Like many colonial creations, Sudan amalgamated territory and peoples had never previously been a coherent entity. Much of northern Sudan is an arid desert, while the south has large areas of rain forests and swamps. Some places in the far north recieve only a week of rain, while the far south can get nine months of rainfall .The experiences of those in north and south have often been as sharply different as Sudan's climate and geography.

Many difficulties arise from the colonial legacy. When Sudan fell under the control of Britain and its quasi-protectorate[21] Egypt in 1898,a joint-authority government was formed. Britain took over management of southern Sudan, leaving the north under nominal Egyptian rule (largely as a nod to former Egyptian territorial claims). Britain developed a "Southern Policy", the primary aim of which was to prevent economic integration of the two regions in order to curtail the north's Arabic and Islamic influence.[22] The British saw a distinct south as a buffer that could preserve English values and beliefs, such as Christianity, and eventually either be developed into a separate political entity or integrated into British East Africa.[23] A Christian missionary presence was encouraged in the south, as were the English language and legal traditions. The southern provinces were largely closed off to northern contact and increasingly isolated.[24]

In the north, where Egypt encouraged Islamic values, Britain focused its efforts largely on economic and social development. Consequently, as disproportionate economic and political power came to be centred in the north, the two regions' cultural and religious identities became more divisive, and the stage was set for discord. In 1947, after realizing the inevitability of Sudanese independence, the British fused the separately ruled zones and gave political power to the northern elite. This transfer at the expense of the south sowed the seeds of war within newly independent Sudan. As former Sudanese Foreign Minister Francis Deng, currently a professor at the City University of New York, writes: " For the South...independence was to prove merely a change of outside masters, with the northerners taking over from the British and defining the nation in accordance with the symbols of their Arab-Islamic identity".[25] With independence imminent, the northern elite commenced "Sudanisation"- replacing British officials with Sudanese nationals. Almost all colonial administrators were removed between June and November 1954.This massive infiltration of

[20] Shannon Field, 2000. "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry", Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Occasional Paper No.23, (Braamfontein: IGD).

[21] Britain became involved in Egyptian affairs in the 1870s but did not declare a protectorate over Egypt until 1914.

[22] Peter Woodward,"Sudan:War without End",in Oliver Furley (ed.) *Conflict in Africa* (NewYork,1995).

[23] Robert Collins, *Shadows in the Grass* (New Haven,1983).

[24] History of Sudan, *Britain's Southern Policy*, p.1.

[25] Francis M.Deng,*War of Visions,* Brookings Institution,Washington D.C.,1995.

northerners into the government greatly alarmed southerners.[26] In September 1956, the Legislative Assembly appointed a committee to draft a national constitution, only three of whose 46 members were southerners. The southern delegation walked out after its repeated calls for a federal constitution were outvoted.[27]

Violent conflict broke out even before independence in January 1956. In 1955, as independence approached, southern apprehension led to riots and a bloody rebellion[28]. After hearing rumors that they were to be disarmed and transferred to the north, soldiers from the army's Southern Corps mutinied, and at least 300 people (mostly northerners) died. Mutineers who evaded imprisonment fled into the bush or neighboring countries. In November 1958, the army, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power. The military regime suppressed opposition, imprisoning politicians, trade unionists, students and communists[29] . Abboud also launched a controversial effort to accelerate "Islamisation" of the south through an aggressive proselytizing campaign. His repression forced thousands of southerners into exile in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia , and the Central African Republic . These re f u gees formed opposition organizations, the most significant of which came to be known as the Sudan African National Union. It petitioned the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), arguing for self-determination and a peaceful solution to the southern Sudan problem [30].

While the Sudan African National Union was emerging as a political voice, a southern Sudanese military movement, the *Anya-Nya* ("snake poison"), composed mainly of former soldiers and policemen from the 1955 mutiny, materialized out of the bush. Feeling underrepresented and discriminated against, the southern civilian population supported *Anya-Nya*. General Abboud responded with a sweeping military campaign, and over half a million southerners fled as refugees.[31] As the war intensified and the government refused to acknowledge its root cause was the lack of southern political and economic power, even the Sudan African National Union, which initially condemned the *Anya-Nya's* violent tactics, organized guerrilla attacks.[32] By 1963, there was full-fledged civil war.

With southern grievances rising, Nimeiri became increasingly apprehensive that half of the Southern Command was controlled by former *Anya-Nya*. In January 1983, southern troops of the 105th battalion refused orders to abandon their weapons and be transferred north. They feared they would be sent to Iraq to join another Sudanese contingent fighting in that country's

[26] Of the eight hundred posts granted by the Sudanese Public Service during this period, Southerners received only six junior positions. Taisier M.Ali and Robert O. Matthews, *Civil Wars in Africa* (London, 1999),p.203.

[27] Francis M.Deng,"Negotiating a Hidden Agenda:Sudan's Conflict of Identities" in I.William Zartman (ed.) *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,* Brookings Institution,Washington D.C.,1995,p.86.

[28] Peter Woodward,"Sudan:War without End",in Oliver Furley (ed.) *Conflict in Africa* (NewYork,1995).

[29] History of Sudan, *Britain's Southern Policy*, p.1.

[30] ibid

[31]Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (London, 1968), p.84.

[32] Dunstan Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (NewYork, 1981), p.90.Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: FromConflict to Peace (London,1975),p.87.

war against Iran and leave the south vulnerable to an all-northern unit.[33] After negotiations failed, Nimeiri ordered an attack on the insubordinate soldiers in May 1983. The southern unit fled, taking weapons and equipment and inspiring a succession of desertions and mutinies in the south throughout the year.[34] The mutineers found sanctuary in Ethiopia, where they united to form the SPLA.

The military success of the SPLA in its first seven years was significant but it soon endured severe setbacks. In May 1991, the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia deprived it of its main operating base, its primary military and financial supplier and most of its military momentum. The new provisional Ethiopian government, composed of various rebel groups backed by the Sudanese government, was hostile. The SPLA evacuated its military camps, and 200,000 Sudanese refugees were forced back into harm's way on the battlefields of southern Sudan.[35] In May 1991, the Sudanese air force bombed Sudanese refugees as they fled their camps in Ethiopia.[36]

Although the forced departure from Ethiopia placed tremendous strain on the SPLA, and Bashir expected the rebels to concede, Garang held fast.[37] Several SPLA military leaders, however, began to seriously question Garang's leadership. A major split erupted within the SPLA over the perceived lack of broad-based participation in its leadership. The fissure also had an ethnic dimension, as the splinter group, SPLA-United led by Riak Machar, took most of the Nuer ethnic component with it. There was a history of tension between the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups - the dominant groups in the SPLA - and the government sought to exacerbate the rift by providing aid and encouraging SPLA-United to attack its former compatriots. Within months, nearly 70 per cent of the Bor Dinka ethnic group in the southern Upper Nile region had been displaced, with thousands of civilians killed or wounded by the SPLA-United. Nuer communities felt the devastating repercussions from revenge raids by Garang's SPLA.[38] This intra-southern fighting continued throughout much of the 1990s.

With bloodletting preoccupying the South, the government felt a military victory was tantalizingly close. Iran’s President Rafsanjani visited Khartoum in December 1991, declared the civil war a *jihad* and signed military protocols, including one promising to pay for U.S. $300 million in Chinese military material.[39] The new weapons allowed the army to mount a

[33] Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier, "The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army" in M.W.

Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds), *Civil War in the Sudan* (NewYork,1993),p.124.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier, "The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army" in M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds),Civil War in the Sudan (New York,1993),p.139.

[36] Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Requiem for the Sudan* (Boulder, 1995),p.296.

[37] Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington, 1998), p.157.

[38] Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities", *African Studies Review*, September, 1999, p.128

[39] Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Requiem for the Sudan* (Boulder, 1995), p.306

forefront offensive in February 1992, and by mid-year the SPLA was on the defensive.[40] The bloodshed and the SPLA's decline led to a proliferation of third-party mediation attempts. Talks convened in Abuja, Nigeria from 26 May to 4 June 1992 with the government and both the SPLA and the SPLA-United attended. The government insisted that SPLA-United have its own delegation; in an effort to play the rebel factions against one another.[41] The talks were doomed. The government came prepared to make no concessions because of its military success. The SPLA was in a weak bargaining position.

Though international pressure caused the Abuja talks to re s u m e approximately a year later, the sides deadlocked again on the hot-button issues: religion and state; the political system and security during an interim period; socio-economic policies; and a referendum on self-determination.[42] In 1994 Riak changed the name of his movement from SPLA-United to the Southern Sudan Independence Movement. Unable to secure weapons abroad, he increasingly turned to Khartoum to maintain his fight against Garang. Consequently, the fighting between Dinka and Nuer intensified. In April 1996, Riak and other former SPLA officers and politicians negotiated a "Peace Charter" with the government. A year later it was transformed into a formal "Peace Agreement" that offered vague promises that "a regional referendum on southern Sudanese independence would take place after an 'interim period' of four years in exchange for Riak's cooperation in merging his remaining forces with the national army".[43] Despite the bitter Dinka-Nuer divisions in the south throughout the mid- 1990s, the SPLA increased contacts with the National Democratic Alliance, in a partnership based on a shared antipathy for the National Islamic Front government. This relationship made for strange bedfellows. In the late 1980s several of the allies had been adversaries, specifically when Sadiq al-Mahdi prosecuted the war against the SPLA. But Bashir's crackdown on all opposition and introduction of *jihad* forced an alliance of necessity. Commitments were made to overthrow the government , hold a constitutional conference and establish a democratic government with the active participation of all members of the National Democratic Alliance. Though general principles were easily agreed, the details of an interim government and a constitution produced fierce debate and threatened to disband the loose alliance.

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[40] Ibid

[41] In fact, on 25 January 1992 Lam Akol of the SPLM-United signed an agreement with Dr. Ali al-Hajj Muhammad of the government in Frankfurt, Germany. The agreement lead to a cease-fire between the army and the SPLA-United, which allowed government forces to use land controlled by the dissident rebel group to attack SPLA positions. The government promised an interim period during which a referendum would be held so the people of the south could "freely choose the political and constitutional status that accords with their national aspirations without ruling out any option". See Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington, 1998), p.173.The government failed to follow through on all promises made to SPLA-United at Frankfurt.

[42] Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington,1998),p.178.

[43] Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson,"Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarisation of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities", *African Studies Review*, September, 1999,p.129.

The SPLA feared that the northern parties had no interest in the south, we re using the SPLA for its military strength and would retain Islamic law and revert to past behavior once they overthrew Bashir. The northern parties were skeptical of the SPLA's commitment to a unified Sudan. Some feared the SPLA would ultimately sign an agreement with the government that allowed for a separate south controlled by the S P L A, while conceding the north to the National Islamic Front. Throughout the mid-1990s, the National Democratic Alliance sought a formula to reconcile the divergent visions of its secularists and its religious-based political parties. Underlying mistrust continued to prevent it from becoming a more substantial political threat. Nonetheless, it provided the SPLA with important northern and southern allies after its disastrous schism .In March 1995 the Sudanese government bombed Ugandan territory, which prompted President Yoweri Museveni to break diplomatic relations and increase support for the SPLA.[44] Sudan's meddling in Eritrea and Ethiopia alienated those regimes, which consequently also began to help the rebels. The United States gave no direct assistance but provided the SPLA with moral and political support. Garang's 1995 visit to the U. S. instilled him with confidence that the rebel movement was respected by the U.S. government - an important endorsement for any rebel group constantly in search of legitimacy.[45]

There was only a nominal change when Sudan's government transformed itself in 1993 from a military to a civilian one. President Bashir ruled with behind-the-scenes help from Hassan al-Turabi and other National Islamic Front hard - liners. Bashir held elections for the firs t time in March 1996, although they we re widely boycotted by the National Democratic Alliance political parties and other opposition groups and deemed illegitimate by most international observers . Not surprisingly, he won 75.7 per cent of the vote, with only an estimated 7 to 15 per cent of eligible voters in Khartoum going to the polls.[46] Turabi was elected unopposed Speaker of the National Assembly. The entrenchment of National Islamic Front influence constrained the regime's policy options to a degree. Bashir pursued the *jihad* with a vengeance, declaring, "The basic Islamic agenda of the regime will not change. Islam is the cornerstone of our policy. . . "[47] This was a time of intense isolation for the government .Support for Iraq during the Gulf War, the extreme Islamist agenda and a policy of harbouring terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, alienated many former allies.

In 1995 the SPLA mounted its first major offensive since its expulsion fro m Ethiopia and won a series of victories over the ensuing two years. In July 1997, under heavy military and sustained international pressure, the government finally agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Declaration of Principles.[48] The

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[44] Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington, 1998), p.185

[45] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Sudan*, 1996.

[46] Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington,1998),p.125.In the highly controlled December 2000 election, the government won 270 out of 360 seats in parliament, a body that largely remains a rubber stamp for Bashir and the National Islamic Front party leadership.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ann Mosely Lesch, "Sudan: The Torn Country", *Current History*, May 1999, p.220. For further discussion of the IGAD peace initiative and principles see especially Chapter 6.

environment of political repression and authoritarian rule continued throughout the 1990s. Late in the decade, a combination of military pressure and international isolation induced the government to institute cosmetic political and human rights reforms that led many in the international community to conclude that fundamental change was coming. In May 1998, the government adopted a new constitution, which promised basic liberties, such as freedom of religion, freedom of association and self-determination for southern Sudan. However r, these re forms were implemented in very limited, manipulative and politically controlled fashion. In December 1999 President Bashir declared a new state of emergency, dismissed Turabi as Speaker of Parliament ,and dissolved that body only two days be fore it was to vote on a bill - crafted by Turabi - designed to reduce presidential powers .[49]

2.4 Gender based impact of the war in Southern Sudan

The gender impact of war can be analyzed and categorized into physical effects, economic and social effects. It is to be noted that the effects are experienced during war and post war periods. Below is a discussion of these effects and a brief analysis of the policy framework to address these effects.

Physical impact: Deaths, Injuries and incapacitation of women in Southern Sudan

Sudanese women and girls account for a smaller percentage of casualties from landmines and unexploded munitions than their counterparts, men and boys[50]. However, as a result of socio-cultural perceptions the consequences for Sudan female victims are different. They continue to suffer stigma and rejection and may also have less access to prosthetic and rehabilitation services. Anti-personnel landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) strike blindly and senselessly, often injuring civilians more than any other victims. Long after the fighting stopped, mines continued to cause death and destruction and when they don't kill, the injuries they cause are particularly horrific, disabling survivors for life[51]. Most victims of mines and unexploded ordnance are Sudanese men who were working outdoors at the time of the accident. Sudanese women and girls tend to remain in or around their homes, and are thus less likely to be exposed. Nevertheless, going about their daily routine puts them in harm's way. In many regions of Sudan, women must venture beyond the perimeters of their town or village to find food, water and firewood. Populations fleeing violence and threats, mostly women and children, are particularly vulnerable to landmines in border areas. Higher rates of illiteracy and less contact with the public sphere mean that Sudanese women and girls may not get enough information about the threat of mines.[52]

Implications of injuries through landmines

[49] U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Sudan, 1999, available at www.state.gov.

[50]ICRC Report, 2005: *Women and war*:

[51] ICRC Women and War team (2004). Addressing the Needs of Women Affected by Armed Conflict. Geneva: ICRC, pp. 59 - 60

[52] Ibid

The implications of landmine injuries for women in general and Sudanese women in particular are often worse than for men. Women are more likely to be valued for their physical appearance, meaning that if they are perceived to be disabled, they may be deemed unmarriageable or deserted by their husbands and left to support their children alone. Their status in society and their self-esteem suffer when they can no longer carry out childcare or household duties. Destitution may reduce them to begging or leave them particularly vulnerable to ill-treatment, sexual exploitation or prostitution.[53]

Taking up arms and forced conscription

Women today enlist more frequently and play a greater role in military combat and support operations. In the United States military, for example, around 15 per cent of service personnel are women[54]. Similarly, an increasing number of women are fighting in armed groups: in Nepal, women reportedly make up about one third of the Maoist fighting forces. Reasons why women take up arms vary. Some, like men, are recruited by the regular armed forces of their country. Others join government forces or armed groups for their own protection or that of their families, food, social standing, or for political reasons. Still others may join to gain equal status with men or because their husband is already a member and combatant of a particular group. Women are generally more likely to take up arms when they have no family or are living in extreme poverty. [55]

Majority of women in Sudan join armed groups completely against their will. However, the Sudanese women and girls abducted by armed groups don't always participate directly in the fighting; many end up as sex slaves, or cooking and cleaning in the camps. Forced recruitment is a way to terrorize civilians. It's a vicious cycle, often turning abductees into hardened killers by forcing them to commit monstrous acts. In some armed groups the first assignment given to a new recruit is to attack her own village or murder a family member, so that desertion is not an option. The more violations they commit, including abhorrent crimes against civilians, the more likely they are to rise through the ranks. They may become dependent on the groups that recruited them. Many develop addictions to drugs and alcohol, supplied to induce aggression and fearlessness.[56]

Scars of the conflict

When the fighting stopped, female fighters in general and specifically women in Sudan often found it difficult to return to civilian society. In southern Sudan, many female ex-combatants express their frustration at the uncertainty of their future. For them, it's difficult to return to the community after demobilization and become a civilian again. Rejection by the community for having affronted female stereotypes and traditional values is one of the greatest obstacles

[53] *Violence Against Girls and Women: A Public Health Priority.* UNFPA. 1999.

[54] Kari Karamé (1999): 'Women and War: a highly complex interrelation' in Helland, Karamé,Kristensen and kjelsbæk eds: *Women and Armed Conflicts.* A study for the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Oslo, NUPI, pp.4–35

[55] Opcit

[56] *Violence Against Girls and Women: A Public Health Priority.* UNFPA. 1999.

to successful reintegration.[57] Unlike men for whom military service is generally a source of pride, women are believed to be unsuited to such a role and thus risk marginalization. In many societies, women attain economic and social status through marriage. After war, the scarcity of men or rejection of a girl who has taken part in the conflict, willingly or not, can limit or end her chances of finding a husband. And some women may return home as single mothers, with all the various issues this raises for many communities.[58]

Detention

It is estimated that women represent only 4 to 5 per cent of the prison population around the world. The number of women held in relation to an armed conflict is even lower, which reflects the fact that women constitute a minority in armed forces and groups. Even when they are members, they may not be allowed to fight on the front line, which reduces the risk they will be captured.[59] Also, male civilians are more likely to be perceived as combatants or potential combatants and hence detained or interned for security reasons. While there are fewer Sudanese women than men in detention, their conditions are no better. All detainees must cope with separation from their family and friends, but women may be particularly affected. Women's prisons are rare in Sudan[60]. Many Sudanese women therefore end up far from their families and far from the court in charge of their trial. Alternatively, Sudanese female detainees may be held in the same prisons as men, which can have a negative impact on their situation.

Rapes as a method of warfare in Sudan

Rape is considered to be a method of warfare when armed forces or groups use it to torture, injure, extract information, degrade, displace, intimidate, punish or simply to destroy the fabric of the community. The mere threat of sexual violence can cause entire communities to flee their homes. By violating women, the Sudan Government arms bearers are able to humiliate and demoralize the men who could not protect them. Where the integrity of the community and the family is perceived as bound up in the "virtue" of women, rape can be used as a deliberate tactic to destabilize families and communities.[61] As in many contexts a woman who has been raped is believed to have brought dishonor upon her family or community, victims may be abandoned or even killed to salvage the family's reputation, a so-

[57] Donald Horowitz: 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict:* university of California Press: Berkely 1985
[58] Post modernist Feminism influenced by French thinkers such as Michael Foulcalt , Jacques Derrida and others made significant shift form analyzing women's position in the world of work and the sexual division of labor to the analysis of identity construction
[59] Thomas Schelling.1960. *The Strategy of conflict*: Havard Univeristy Press
[60] Donald Parkhurst.2000. Women, Gender and Peace Building. Working Paper No.5. Department of Peace Studies, University of Brandford, Brandford p.11
[61] S Maguire .1998. 'Researching a "Family Affair". Domestic Violence in former Yugoslavia and Albania in C Sweetman, ed. Violence against women. Oxfam publications: Oxford.

called "honor" killing. Victims of sexual violence may also be rejected by their community on the assumption that they have been infected with HIV/AIDS.

Social impact: Health, Education and basic necessities of Sudanese women

When considering the impact of war on health, physical injuries come to mind first. But war also undermines access to food, clean drinking water, adequate shelter, sanitary facilities and health services; as a consequence, the risk of epidemics and nutritional problems is much higher. Women in general and Sudanese health often suffered in times of armed conflict, in particular their reproductive health. The age at which women or girls become sexually active, the frequency of their pregnancies and the quality of the care they receive during pregnancy are critical factors in determining their state of health. All of the above was severely affected by armed conflict[62]. Even if Sudanese women normally have access to family planning services, they were deprived of means of contraception when they were forced to flee, leading to a higher frequency of pregnancies. A sharp increase in rape, sexual exploitation and sex for survival during war lead to more early pregnancies and put Sudanese women at greater risk of HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted infections. Pregnant women and nursing mothers found that there was limited ante and postnatal care available, and little or no medical assistance for the delivery itself.

This often resulted in higher maternal mortality rates. For all women, reproductive health care is essential and normally covers the following areas: antenatal, obstetric and postnatal care, family planning, and the prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections (including HIV/AIDS). Since some or all of these services were not available in times of conflict, problems went untreated, which resulted to severe consequences for Sudanese women. It was especially common for maternity services to be neglected. The immunization of pregnant women and children was another very important facet of maternal and child health services; yet all too often the Sudan conflict disrupted national immunization campaigns if at all they existed.[63]

Break down of the social unit through displacement and missing relatives

Millions of people worldwide have been brutally uprooted from their homes and livelihoods. As a result, they often find themselves living in difficult conditions with inadequate access to food, water, shelter and health care. Displaced women in Sudan had to manage alone and assume extra responsibilities, which took its toll on their health and put them at greater risk of sexual violence and abuse. In the chaos and panic of displacement, which all too often took place on foot, families became separated. [64] This created a number of problems for Sudanese

[62] Korac op. cit
[63] Cynthia Cockburn.1999. "Gender Armed Conflict and political Violence", Paper presented at a workshop in Gender, Armed Conflict and political Violence" paper presented in at a workshop on Gender, Armed Conflict and political violence. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
[64] Kabeer, Naila, "Gender, Development and Training: Raising Awareness in Development Learning" paper presented at National Labor Institute.

women and exposed them to various hazards. In some of Sudan traditional cultures they were not permitted to travel unless accompanied by their husband or a male family member. Many did not have the necessary personal documentation to cross checkpoints or international borders. They were stopped, harassed, or subjected to humiliating body searches. For the Sudanese women, life was centered on the home and the community, so leaving their land and traditions was extremely traumatic. This upheaval resulted in a loss of identity and status, especially when combined with the disintegration of the family unit.[65]

For hundreds of thousands of Sudanese women, one of the worst consequences of armed conflict was the long and agonizing wait for news about their relatives. In the Sudan war, countless people lost touch with their loved ones. The reasons for this varied. Families became separated while seeking refuge from the violence. Displacement often prevented people from sending news to their next of kin. Civilians may have been abducted or arrested and held incommunicado. Children may have been forcibly recruited, imprisoned or even hastily adopted. While many attempts to restore contact between family members and establish the fate of missing relatives are successful, for others the uncertainty goes on. Anguish over the fate of missing family members is often a harsh reality for families long after a conflict has ended. Since the vast majority of those who disappear or are killed are men (usually of a military age, although many have not taken up arms), the burden and pain of trying to ascertain their fate and whereabouts fell to their Sudanese female relatives.[66]

2.5 Economic effects of the war

The economic effects of the war may be construed to include the loss of current earnings as well as the capacity to earn in the future. Loss of earnings come about through jobs lost through war. In addition, poverty of women is also brought about by missing breadwinners who are either killed in the battlefield or go to fight never to retun.

Loss of livelihood and challenging roles

When Sudanese men were absent – participating in the fighting, detained, fleeing or dead – the burden of providing for the basic needs of their families fell to women, with various spillover effects for their daughters. They were compelled to take on new responsibilities, often including heavy chores, and additional roles within the family and the community – roles which often challenge and redefine their cultural and social identities.[67] These changes in the roles ascribed to girls can sometimes be seen as positive developments; girls do mature more quickly when faced with armed conflict and acquire new levels of responsibility and

[65] M Zalewsky.1995. "Feminism and war. Well, what is the feminist perspective on Bosnia?" International Affairs,Vol.71.No.2 p.347
[66] Skjelsback,I.And Smith, D. 2001, " Introduction in Gender, Peace and conflict". Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi
[67] Cynthia Cockburn.1999. "Gender Armed Conflict and political Violence", Paper presented at a workshop in Gender, Armed Conflict and political Violence" paper presented in at a workshop on Gender, Armed Conflict and political violence. The World Bank. Washington D.C.

independence. Yet it is important to weigh these benefits against the loss, poverty and deprivation endemic to war, and the fact that in many societies' women and girls still only gain economic and social status through marriage.[68] The lack of marriage prospects – because there are too few men or because society rejects girls who have been abused or have played a role in hostilities – can have huge implications.

Poverty arising out of missing bread winners

When the missing person is the household breadwinner, Sudanese wives and mothers had to find ways to support the family, often facing a life of poverty – a situation that was exacerbated by the low social status and marginalization they suffered in the society. Many lacked a trade or source of income that would enable them to provide for their dependants. Furthermore, their legal status was unclear, since they were no longer wives yet not officially widows.[69] Some countries allow years to pass before declaring a person officially dead or absent. Without the proper documentation, women cannot claim an inheritance, seek guardianship of children, access property or even remarry. Women may not be able to seek help from the authorities due to financial constraints, safety concerns, cultural barriers or a lack of information.[70]

Girl children and war in Sudan

Like all other children in times of war/ conflict, the hardship Sudanese children endured during the war strikes at the very heart of childhood. Conflict in Sudan killed thousands of girls and boys and disabled many more – through injury, disease or malnutrition. The experience of war harmed children's physical development while the violence they witnessed inevitably had a psychological impact. Then Sudan War deprived girls and boys of family members, educational opportunities and health services, as well as carefree time spent with friends in the playground. [71] Girls per se were vulnerable in the Sudan armed conflicts, but the younger they were, the more vulnerable they were. As children, they can be categorized as vulnerable by virtue of their age, their stage of development and their dependence on others for their well-being. As females, they may face the same discrimination, challenges and risks that women are exposed to.

[68] M Zalewsky.1995. "Feminism and War. Well, what is the feminist perspective on Bosnia?" International Affairs,Vol.71.No.2 p.347
[69] Kabeer, Naila, "Gender, Development and Training: Raising Awareness in development Learning" paper presented at National Labor Institute.
[70] S Maguire .1998. 'Researching a "Family Affair". Domestic Violence in former Yugoslavia and Albania in C Sweetman, ed. Violence against women. Oxfam publications: Oxford.
[71] Donald Parkhurst.2000. Women, Gender and peace building. Working Paper No.5. Department of Peace Studies, University of Brandford, Brandford p.11

It is widely accepted that in any society, girls' safety depends largely on the traditional protection afforded to them by their families and communities. However, during conflict, communities and families are fragile, and hence unable to offer this much needed protection. The Sudan scenario is no different. During the Sudan war, young girls were forced to flee their homes, and in the chaos some children became separated from their parents. Children and girls in particular were frequently exposed to threats of abduction, sexual abuse or violence from members of military forces or armed groups, or other men, including those who were supposed to be protecting them.[72] Arms bearers often abducted Sudanese girls to fight or to serve as forced labor - to cook, clean and fetch water and firewood and sometimes as sexual slaves. All of the above left the girls vulnerable to sexual violence, which often has even more serious consequences for girls than for women. The violence of the act combined with their physical immaturity increases the likelihood of physical trauma and of sexually transmitted infections such as HIV/AIDS. In some cultures in Sudan, rape victims were considered unmarriageable, meaning that a girl's entire future in her community was jeopardized.[73]

Early pregnancy, often a result of rape or exploitation, posed a serious threat to Sudanese girls' health. Girls who became pregnant prematurely were at greater risk of complications and death, especially as medical services were often scarce in wartime. Motherhood at a young age also has profound socioeconomic implications, since girls encumbered by child rearing are generally unable to complete their education and are thus consigned to a lifetime of poverty.[74]

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the southern Sudan war was caused by a multiplicity of factors ranging from religion intolerance, economic agendas from the Khartoum government and outsiders, globalization as well as local ethnicity. The effects of the war have been not only sociological; they have also been physical and as economic. In relation to this, the social fabric has been torn, education halted and healthcare abandoned. Women, men and children have been killed, detained, mutilated and raped. The war has led to the loss of live hood and increased poverty. Finally, this chapter notes that the girl child has been mostly affected by the war due to their vulnerability as a disintegrated society affords them no protection.

[72] *Violence Against Girls and Women: A Public Health Priority.* UNFPA. 1999.
[73] ICRC Report, 2005: *Women and war*:
[74] Ibid