INFLUENCE OF TEAM NEGOTIATIONS ON COLLABORATIVE VALUE WITHIN ASHOKA FELLOWS' ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

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Influence of Team Negotiations on Collaborative Value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa

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Abstract

Purpose: The study sought to determine the influence of team negotiations on collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa

Methodology: The study applied pragmatism philosophy to offer several ways to bridge dichotomies in mixed methods approaches to social science. Explanatory sequential mixed-method research design consisting of two distinct phases, namely quantitative and qualitative, was adopted. Both qualitative and quantitative study methods were adopted. In the quantitative study, the target population constituted all the 154 Ashoka Fellows' Organizations working in 19 countries in Africa. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire administered online to the founders (Ashoka Fellows) or the Ashoka Fellows' Organizations' CEOs. One hundred responded by filling out the questionnaire, which translated to a 64.9% response rate. Additionally, qualitative data applied purposive sampling and selected six Ashoka regional team leaders in Africa for in-depth interviews. They all were available for the interviews translating to a 100% response rate. Data analysis techniques combined descriptive and inferential statistics. Statistical Package for Social Sciences and SmartPLS 3 software were used to analyze the collected data.

Findings: The study results revealed that team negotiation significantly influences collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. Team Negotiations have a significant influence on collaborative value with an R^2 = 0.214, chi-square X^2 (10, N=100) = 72.319, p<.05, SRMR=0.090, Rms-theta=0.234, and NFI=0.773. The null hypothesis was rejected.

Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study recommends that negotiating teams should ensure that they know as much as possible about the other side of the negotiation. The teams' perception is vital in the negotiating team's preparedness as they should be aware of what is necessary at every stage of the negotiating process. When negotiating, the focus should be on looking for alternative ways of dealing with the problem before finding a solution that satisfies all members. The evaluation of options during team negotiations should be objective. At large, the negotiating teams should ensure that all members feel comfortable with the solution to the problem raised before making the steps to implement the solution.

Keywords: *Team Negotiations, Collaborative Value, Ashoka Fellows' Organizations*

INTRODUCTION

A Negotiation team is a group of two or more interdependent persons who join together as a single negotiating party because of their similar interests and objectives related to the negotiation and who are all present at the bargaining table (Aykac, Wilken, Jacob, & Prime, 2017). A negotiating team coordinates and avoids process losses as it performs specific tasks more effectively than a single member of the team, which agrees with the saying that two heads are better than one (Gelfand et al., 2013). Negotiation teams also have more expertise to solve problems and generate more ideas as they are in a better position to synthesize information, primarily in a complex decision-making task. Also, members of a negotiating team correct each other's biases, make more accurate judgments, and set higher targets (Hüffmeier et al., 2018; Gelfand et al., 2013). They primarily set higher economic goals and limits and engage in more competitive behavior, and as long as this competitiveness does not lead to an impasse, the negotiating team explores results that match their ambitious goals. In team negotiations, members challenge one another's understanding of the situation, thus encouraging a more sophisticated negotiation analysis. Also, teams engage in more across-the-table information exchange and issue investigation, which increases their mutual understanding of the situation, instrumental in complex, multi-issue negotiations (Cordell et al., 2019; Gelfand et al., 2013). Negotiating teams have the salience of social monitoring that leads negotiators to feel closely monitored, socially controlled by their teammates, and more pressure to comply with others' opinions and standards (Cordell et al., 2019).

Negotiating teams on international business negotiations require an effective negotiating team whose analytical work and skills could help achieve the negotiations' highest outcome (Peleckis, 2014). Peleckis's (2014) study of intercultural negotiations notes that understanding other cultures, other languages, possession of legal knowledge, and knowledge of the negotiation context is critical. The preparation phase should also ensure that the negotiating team knows about the other side of the negotiation as much as possible, as knowing the other negotiation side's technical communication capabilities allows for adequate practical negotiation support tools. Peleckis concludes by saying that team negotiation's success often depends on the preparation's effectiveness (Peleckis, 2014).

The team leadership study looks at the teams' priorities as key in the negotiating team's preparedness. The assumption is that priorities represent the quality of being aware of what is necessary at every stage (Peleckis, 2014) of the negotiating process, including the level of preparedness. Team negotiations based on team strategy can either be a win-win or a lose-lose. Schramm and Morais (2013) propose a framework to support negotiations between buyer and seller teams in the construction industry's supply chain. In a buyer-seller team negotiation process, each team develops its strategy to achieve its objective; a possible consequence of this setting is that both parties lose, especially when the negotiation process involves other issues beyond the price. For example, from the buyer team view, they can attain the lowest price in the purchase; however, the acquired product or service may be of low quality; in which case, the seller team also loses since a product/service with low quality can affect the confidence between the parties (Schramm & Morais, 2013). The study proposes that team negotiation success rate can improve

through a multicriteria additive framework that supports bilateral and multi-issue negotiations between buyer teams and material seller teams, where the teams reach a deal based on their business strategies. The system plays the mediator's role, as it supports the negotiators to reach the optimal solution, which meets their interests. However, the negotiation team is responsible for deciding if the system's answer accomplishes its strategy. With the automated algorithm for negotiation, the negotiating team reaches an efficient contract with mutual gains. The study confirms that the mediation mechanism is constant in the context of a negotiation, as the negotiation team's behavior is predicted (Schramm & Morais, 2013). The combined use of business strategies and the investigation of the efficient frontier allow maximum results for both sides. However, when negotiation teams do not accept the proposed framework's solution, a conflict situation may arise (Schramm & Morais, 2013). The team leadership study did not investigate what brings about contentiousness in team negotiations.

Negotiating teams use deceptive tactics to achieve the negotiation's highest impact. Aykac, Wilken, Jacob, and Prime (2017) conducted a study to investigate the use of deceptive tactics as a possible means for teams to reach higher negotiation profits. They considered two main deceptive tactics: deception by commission, where the negotiating teams misrepresent the truth, often characterized or perceived as lying, and deception by omission, where the teams passively misrepresent the truth by failing to disclose information that would benefit the other. Using a data set that combines unreported data from a published study by Wilken, Jacob, and Prime (2013), with data initially collected to compare negotiation teams, the study noted that negotiating teams have fewer ethical concerns about their actions' consequences in various social environments. The study also illuminates the potential relationship between superior performance and the higher propensity of teams to engage in ethically deceptive negotiation tactics compared to individuals. Teams use deceptive tactics with different intensities for deception by omission vs. deception by commission, using the latter less often. Both omission and commission pay off for the deceiver, but commission is beneficial to a greater extent (Aykac et al., 2017). The team leadership study investigates negotiating teams' priorities when negotiating.

Teams also renegotiate. Voeth and Lenzing (2017) investigated the impact of teams' renegotiation on relationship continuity. The first step of the analysis pursued a better understanding of renegotiation outcomes and their impact on relationship continuity, and the second step analyzed the conceptualization and detailed negotiation strategies and their impacts on renegotiation results. There is a distinction between three different types of renegotiations: post-deal, intra-deal, and extra-deal. These renegotiations are a negotiation related to a prior negotiation between the same teams and representing an agreement to alter an original contract and treat it as the new contract. Thus, post-deal renegotiations are follow-up negotiations, while intra-deal renegotiations occur within an established contractual relationship, which the underlying contract explicitly allows. Extra-deal renegotiation demand is not legitimized through the original contract or a legal basis and has no legal justification.

Nevertheless, a team demands extra-deal renegotiations to improve the original contract in its favor, thereby forcing the other team to give up something that it felt it already owned (Voeth &

Lenzing, 2017). The study results indicate that renegotiation's social-psychological outcome substantially impacts the probability of relationship continuity more than the economic outcome measures. The study also confirmed that the conceptualized renegotiation strategies impact the renegotiation outcomes and affect the probability of relationship continuity by mediation through the social-psychological outcome. This is especially important from a negotiating team's perspective because it shows that a deliberate selection of the renegotiation strategy allows renegotiation for short-term improvements while simultaneously minimizing the relationships' adverse effects (Voeth & Lenzing, 2017). Thus, this study agrees that the negotiating team's priorities and contentiousness have an influence on collaborative value.

Negotiating teams may be advantageous if individual negotiators can observe and learn this skill from others. Hüffmeier et al.'s (2018a) study on negotiating teams challenges team advantages' predominant perspective on integrative negotiations and introduces a more frugal account based on individual-level processes. The study was carried out by conducting multiple comparisons of team-on-team and solo-on-solo negotiations and, second, by examining individual learning processes in teams. Thirdly, the study shows that the individual-level process can be learned by merely observing another individual applying it successfully. This suggests that negotiating teams may be advantageous if individual negotiators can observe and learn this skill from others. As the fourth contribution and the most relevant one from an applied perspective, the study shows that teams may achieve worse relationship outcomes, representing a disadvantage of integrative negotiations. Importantly, this effect holds even when individuals operate on the same economic performance level as teams.

Finally, the study concludes that team negotiations' success over solo negotiations is most likely because a competent negotiator was at the table. Thus, the assumption that complex team-related advantages and team member interaction explains team negotiations' practical advantages. The study further proposes that when teams are negotiating parties, cooperative solutions' preferences become weaker because of the inter-individual-inter-team discontinuity effect resulting from the reduced trust, heightened greed, and social support for self-interested behavior in team interactions (Hüffmeier et al., 2018a). The team leadership study investigates the effect of negotiating teams on collaborative value. The assumption is that the Ashoka teams work together. The study, therefore, focuses on the teams' priorities as they negotiate. The study also seeks to understand, similar to Hüffmeier et al.'s study, if their decisions are affected by contentiousness.

Technology in Team Negotiation

Team negotiations are being taken over by new technologies and innovations, changing how people communicate and exchange information in various areas. Teamwork and decision-making computers are increasingly used to transfer data between team members, including the framework of team negotiation (Kersten & Lai, 2010). A significant problem within team negotiation is that its members, although they form one joint negotiation party, often have diverse priorities. If these are not discussed and aligned by the team members before the negotiation to create consensus on collective priorities, they achieve more inferior negotiation results. To represent the whole team's preferences in a negotiation, the representative must enter the negotiation with an already clear

concept of the team members' joint priorities. However, if the preferences of the team members are not discussed and aligned before the negotiation in order to agree on joint team priorities, the representative is not able to judge appropriately which negotiation issues serve the team's preferences best in the negotiation (Thiemann, Hesse, & Kozlov, 2019; Thiemann & Engelmann, 2015). The excellent news for negotiating teams is that advanced technologies offer increasing possibilities to process information and make decisions for humans, such as software agents that can thoroughly conduct a client's negotiation. As a result, the teams can use computers to take over complex team decisions or negotiation processes considered impracticable (Vahidov, Kersten, & Saade, 2014).

Collaborative team negotiations contribute to a more elaborate decision about teams' priorities beyond the awareness of teams' preferences. When collaboration is missing, nothing hinders the team members or individual teams from pursuing their preferences and goals. Nevertheless, to represent their entire teams in negotiation, team members are expected to shift from their preferences when determining the negotiation priorities. In a collaborative teams' negotiation preparation, team members play an active part in preventing team members from leaning in favor of their preferences to decide which priorities to pursue (Thiemann et al., 2019). A good understanding of the choices of all teams and high similarity of priorities is a prerequisite for successfully negotiating with the opposing party (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010) as it enables the representatives to make mutually beneficial trade-offs with the other party in favor of the team which is an essential indicator for the team negotiation performance.

Further, the experience of resolving conflicts about preference divergences in a collaborative setting also contributes to a better mutual perception within the teams (Thiemann et al., 2019). Even with advanced technologies offering increasing possibilities to process information and make decisions for humans, active collaboration is critical during team decision processes; for example, the alignment of team members' preferences during the negotiation preparation phase can significantly influence the outcomes. However, when team members work in a different department, they could benefit from a more efficient negotiation preparation by providing all their preferences to the representative via computer. It saves time and resources. Hence, even when it is technically possible and practicable to rely solely on computers to provide specific information or fulfill different tasks, collaboration within the team should not be underestimated. Thiemann et al. (2019) study results show that providing complete task-relevant information via computer is insufficient to compensate for the absence of active collaboration within the team: Representatives who could collaborate within the team during the computer-mediated negotiation preparation phase (1) moved away more from their initial individual priorities, (2) stated more similar priorities within the team, (3) assessed more accurately the importance of different negotiation issues for the team, which was mediated by the similarity of priorities within the team, and (4) were more satisfied. Although the team leadership study has no emphasis on the use of technology for team negotiations, technology's effectiveness may be one that mitigates team priorities and contentiousness in team negotiations.

Functional Team Leadership Theory

Zaccaro, Rittman, and Marks (2001) developed the functional team leadership theory to emphasize leadership as a frontier role linking teams to their wider environment as team problems originate from their environment. Their diagnosis requires that leaders attune to the developments and events outside of the team. Further, leaders have the obligation of interpreting and defining environmental proceedings for their teams. The second difference is that leadership typically involves discretion and choosing what solutions would be appropriate in particular problem domains. Team actions that are wholly specified or fully elicited by the situation do not require team leaders' intervention. Leadership is dictated by team problems in which multiple solution paths are viable and requisite solutions are applied in complex social setups through development. Team members in leadership roles are then responsible for making choices that define succeeding teams' responses.

Thirdly, functional leadership is defined by generic responses that vary in different problem situations and not by a specific set of behaviors where the emphasis switches from what leaders should do to what needs to be done for effective performance (Zaccaro, Rittman, & Marks, 2001). The distinction divorces functional leadership perspectives from other models of leader-team interactions that either specify particular leadership behaviors (task-oriented, relationship-oriented) that are considered ideal in most team situations or vary in practice depending on specific team properties and characteristics (Shafique & Beh, 2017). Instead, team leadership is defined in problem-solving activities directed at generating answers that advance team goal attainment (Mumford, Todd, Higgs, & McIntosh, 2017).

One of the assumptions of this theory is that the exterior or structure influences the behavior of the team members. The paradigm assumption, which is founded on the team composition, states that team structure has an influence on the team members' behavior. The 'team size' construct is exemplified as a structural variable that is part of the team structure domain (Hackman, 2002) or the composition constructs (Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993). Given that the size of a team is a structural construct, the underlying assumption is that the said structure influences the behavior of the members of the team. The assumption of how team structure influences behavior is also linked to team homogeneity and heterogeneity. It is asserted that the inherent assumption on interpersonal skills that homogeneity of beliefs, behavior, and attitudes of team members, regardless of it being erroneous or counterproductive, is suitable to the functioning of teams. This alludes to the contribution of the homogeneous structure of team members towards effective team functioning (Campion et al., 1993).

However, the critics of the theory observe that there is no discussion on the culture of the team. This is in spite of the fact that the aforesaid culture can accommodate deviant behavior given that it can make a positive contribution towards the objectives of the overall team (Hackman, 2002). As espoused by the theory, it is argued that the 'composition' constructs like education, expertise, and function, are acquired abilities and skills which fail to describe either behavior or internal traits. It is also pointed out that the aforementioned constructs are encompassed at the

organizational level; individual teams have less control over them (Hackman, The design of work teams, 1987).

Much of the work on team leadership has applied the functional approach. This approach's critical assertion is that it is the leader's job to do or get done whatever is not adequately handled by the team (Zaccaro et al., 2001). This approach recognizes a generic set of leadership functions that are tailored to fit the specific situation. In furthering the work on team leadership, several researchers have begun to delineate these functions. The functional approach is essential in terms of the leadership of teams because (a) it recognizes the importance of context, (b) it recognizes the role team leaders occupy as problem solvers in which they develop and maintain shared behavior, cognition, and affect among team members, and (c) many of the functional behaviors rely heavily on understanding and regulating member cognition in order to promote smooth, coordinated teamwork. Creating the underlying cognitive structures needed for effective teamwork and interpretation of meaning is predicted to be incredibly challenging (Morgeson et al., 2010; Salas, Burke, Wilson-Donnelly, & Fowlkes, 2004).

The tenets of the functional team leadership theory are applicable to team leadership in Ashoka Fellows' Organizations and related entities. Given that the theory illustrates how leadership strives to relate teams to their immediate and wider environment, it is imperative to state that leadership skills that can ensure the foregoing are paramount for the success of the organization to be realized. In tandem with the dictum of the theory, leaders of Ashoka are expected to offer leadership to their teams in terms of interpreting and defining the content, dynamics as well as proceedings within their environment. Expectedly, the aforesaid leadership and involvement of the team members in making crucial decisions is bound to result in the realization of collaborative value for the greater good of the concerned organizations.

METHODOLOGY

The study applied pragmatism philosophy to offer several ways to bridge dichotomies in mixed methods approaches to social science. Explanatory sequential mixed-method research design consisting of two distinct phases, namely quantitative and qualitative, was adopted. Both qualitative and quantitative study methods were adopted. In the quantitative study, the target population constituted all the 154 Ashoka Fellows' Organizations working in 19 countries in Africa. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire administered online to the founders (Ashoka Fellows) or the Ashoka Fellows' Organizations' CEOs. One hundred responded by filling out the questionnaire, which translated to a 64.9% response rate. Additionally, qualitative data applied purposive sampling and selected six Ashoka regional team leaders in Africa for in-depth interviews. They all were available for the interviews translating to a 100% response rate. Data analysis techniques combined descriptive and inferential statistics. Statistical Package for Social Sciences and SmartPLS 3 software were used to analyze the collected data.

RESULTS

Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

Collaborative team negotiations contribute to a more elaborate decision about teams' priorities beyond the awareness of teams' preferences.

Descriptive Statistics on Team Negotiations

The specific elements that the study addressed on team negotiations were priorities and contentiousness of team members. The results in Table 1 revealed that the majority of the respondents were in agreement that team members always reach a consensus before they decide on the next step of action with a mean response rate of 3.96 (Agreement) and a standard deviation of 0.737, with the highest agreement being from West Africa French region (Mean = 4.08). The majority of the respondents were in agreement that team members always look at alternative ways of dealing with the problem before finding a solution that satisfies all members (Mean = 3.87, SD = 0.787), with the highest agreement being from the West Africa English Speaking region with a mean of 3.97. It was agreed upon by most respondents that team members always evaluate their options objectively (Mean = 3.96, SD = 0.71), with the highest agreement being noted from the West Africa French region. On what each team member wants, members determine what is essential and why; the majority were in agreement with an overall mean of 3.88 and standard deviation of 0.7, with the highest agreement being noted from the West Africa French-speaking region. Most respondents agreed that they make sure that all the team members feel comfortable with the solution to the problem (Mean = 4.42, SD = 0.741), with the highest agreement noted in the Pan Africa region.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Team Negotiations

Region	Measure	In my team, we always reach a consensus before we decide on the next step of action	In our team, we always look at alternative ways of dealing with the problem before finding a solution that satisfies all of us	In our team, we always evaluate our options objectively.	Of the things that each team member wants, we determine what is essential and Why	We make sure that all the team members feel comfortable with the solution to the problem
West Africa English Speaking	Mean	4.03	3.97	3.93	3.9	3.55
	N	29	29	29	29	29
	SD	0.778	0.823	0.704	0.557	0.948
West Africa French	Mean	4.08	3.88	4.24	4.2	3.84
	N	25	25	25	25	25
	SD	0.64	0.833	0.436	0.5	0.898
East Africa	Mean	3.82	3.82	3.75	3.86	3.79
	N	28	28	28	28	28
	SD	0.772	0.67	0.752	0.651	0.876
Southern Africa	Mean	3.88	3.88	3.94	3.41	3.76
	N	17	17	17	17	17
	SD	0.781	0.781	0.899	1.004	1.091
Pan Africa	Mean	4	2	4	4	4
	N	1	1	1	1	1
	SD	.	.	.	.	.
Total	**Mean**	**3.96**	**3.87**	**3.96**	**3.88**	**3.73**
	N	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
	SD	**0.737**	**0.787**	**0.71**	**0.7**	**0.93**

Diagnostic Tests on Team Negotiation

The measurement model assessment involved assessing the constructs' internal consistency reliability, multicollinearity test, and normality test as presented in Table 4.27. Team negotiation reliability was 0.728, which is acceptable; a VIF of 1.965 confirmed that the data was devoid of multicollinearity.

A normality test with a significance of below 0.5 indicated that the data was suffering from nonnormality. However, the normal Q-Q plot Figure 4.12 shows that the observed values did not deviate from the expected values.

Table 2: Diagnostic Test Results on Team Negotiation

Reliability Test	Cronbach Alpha	No. of Items	Decision
	0.728	5	Acceptable
Multicollinearity Test	**Tolerance**	**VIF**	
	0.509	1.965	
Normality Test	**Statistic**	**Df**	**Significance**
Kolmogorov-Smirnov	.145	104	.000
Shapiro-Wilk	.956	104	.002

Convergent Validity Analysis for Team Negotiation

Analysis conducted to assess convergent validity on team negotiation statements presented in Table 2 found that some statements had values less than 0.5. The convergent validity for team negotiation met the threshold of 0.5 on average and was therefore acceptable. The team negotiation constructs explained more than 49.2% of their variance.


Figure 1: Normal Q-Q Plot for Team Negotiation

Table 3: Convergent Validity – Team Negotiation

	Initial	Extraction
In my team, we always reach a consensus before we decide on the next step of action	1.000	0.588
In our team, we always look at alternative ways of dealing with the problem before finding a solution that satisfies all of us	1.000	0.415
In our team, we always evaluate our options objectively.	1.000	0.689
Of the things that each team member wants, we determine what is essential and Why	1.000	0.358
We make sure that all the team members feel comfortable with the solution to the problem	1.000	0.410

Exploratory Factor Analysis for Team Negotiation

As presented in Table 4, the KMO index was 0.764, and Bartlett's Test was significant at X^2 (10, N=100) = 102.492, p<.05. This output shows the team negotiation factors were adequate for extraction since the KMO measure was greater than 0.5, and Bartlett's test was significant (p<.05)

Table 4: KMO and Bartletts Test - Team Negotiation

KMO Value		0.764
Bartletts Test	Approx. Chi-Square	102.492
	df	10
	Sig.	0.000

Structural Equation Modeling for Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

The chi-square value for the model relationship between team negotiations and collaborative value was 72.319, significant with a p-value of 0.000. The Normed Fit Index (NFI) was 0.773, which shows that the index was above 0.5, which usually represents an acceptable fit. SRMR value was 0.090, which was below 0.2 for the models. rms_theta value was 0.234 and thus below 0.4, which implied that the model was a good fit. The study used a fixed number of respondents for the analysis with a probability value of 5%. The model's statistical power value was 0.999, revealing that the model had adequate statistical power with a value above 0.8.

There is no probability of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis when that hypothesis is not true in the population. The R^2 value was obtained from the model for the overall model team negotiation and collaborative value (TN&CV). Acceptable R^2 values are based on the context, and an R^2 value as low as 0.10 is considered satisfactory (Hair et al., 2019). The R^2 value obtained on this model was 0.214, which indicated that the team negotiation model accounts for 21.4% of the variation in collaborative value. The variation of 78.6% was accounted for by other variables not included in this model.

Path Analysis for Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

The path analysis confirmed that the constructs used to test team negotiations (TN1-TN5) were adequate with weights between 0.594 and 0.822. This revealed that the Ashoka teams have the correct perception and can manage contentiousness while negotiating. The path analysis also demonstrated a positive relationship between team negotiations and collaborative value, weighted at 0.463, accounting for 21.4% of the variation in collaborative value.


Figure 2: Path Model -Team Negotiation and Collaborative Value

Hypothesis Testing for Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

H $_{05}$: Team Negotiation does not significantly influence Collaborative Value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa.

The hypothesis was tested by using the chi-square test. The acceptance/rejection criteria were that if the p-value is greater than 0.05, the Ho$_5$ is not rejected, but if it is less than 0.05, the Ho$_4$ is rejected. The p-value was 0.000<0.05, and the chi-square value was 72.319; the null hypothesis was rejected. The study concluded that team negotiations influenced collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa.

Robustness Tests of the Hypotheses

Robustness tests evaluated the assumptions. The two tests were in-depth interviews and the statistical value of the latent variables.

Interview Findings for Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

The regional team leaders' interviews indicated that team negotiations were critical within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations as they resonate with their vision of 'Everyone a Changemaker,' where decisions based on a collaborative effort are respected. Ashoka Fellows' Organizations build collaborative relationships by negotiating with companies, one to one or many, placing themselves in the forefront as solution holders for complex social and environmental problems. In the

collaboration, businesses contribute relevant resources and expertise that help the Ashoka teams achieve impact at proportions not previously possible. This collaborative framework also helps shift corporate culture, leadership, and priorities to recognize the essential economic value in upholding a double bottom line of both profit and people. According to the interviewee, only those Ashoka fellow teams with strong negotiation skills could benefit from co-creation with the companies. However, there were obstacles to forming effective partnerships in any unique business environment, from misaligned business incentives to conflicting values.

Model Summary and Statistical Value of the Latent Variables of Team Negotiations and Collaborative Value

The research assessed the model summary and statistical power of Team Negotiations and Associational Value (TN&AV), Team Negotiations and Transferred Asset Value (TN&TAV), Team Negotiations, and Interactive Value (TN&IV), Team Negotiations and Synergistic Value (TN&SV). The R^2 value was obtained from the analysis and presented in Table 4.48. With a probability value of 5%, the sub-models statistical power values were between 0.858 and 0.999, revealing that all the models had a high statistical power of values above 0.8. A confirmation that the null hypothesis was rejected correctly.

The model relationship between Team Negotiations (TN) against Associational Value (AV), Transferred Asset Value (TCV), Interactive Value (IV), Synergistic Value (SV), and Collaborative Value (CV) are shown in Table 4.30. For TN & AV, the R square value of 0.084 indicated that the model of Team negotiations counted for 8.4% of the variation in Associational Value; for TN & TAV, the R square value of 0.162 indicated that the model of Team Negotiations accounted for 16.2% of the variation in transferred asset value, for TN & IV the R square value of 0.240 indicated that the model of team negotiations accounted for 24 % of the variation in interactive value and for TN & SV the R square value of 0.181 indicated that the model of team negotiation accounted for 18.1% of the variation in synergistic value.

All the variations in team negotiations and collaborative value were considered satisfactory with four models above 10%. Interactive value had the highest percentage of 24% (Hair et al., 2019).

Table 5: Model Summary and Statistical Power of Latent Variables

	TN&AV	TN&TAV	TN&IV	TN&SV	TN&CV
Sample size	100	100	100	100	100
Probability	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
R^2	0.084	0.162	0.240	0.181	0.214
Statistical power	0.858	0.998	0.999	0.998	0.999

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The results show that team negotiation significantly influences collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. The SEM and Model fit findings showed that TN accounts for 21.4% of collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa, $R^2 = 0.214$, chi-

square X^2 (10, N=100) = 72.319, p<.05, SRMR=0.090, Rms-theta=0.234, and NFI=0.773. The study, therefore, rejected the null hypothesis, $H0_5$- team negotiations do not significantly influence collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. The results indicate that team negotiations significantly influence collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa.

Conclusions

The study's findings revealed that team negotiations influence collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. The SEM analysis showed a positive unit rise in team negotiations that significantly changes collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa by 21.4%. Team negotiation practices that improve collaborative value include consensus decision on the step of action, evaluation of alternative ways of dealing with the problem objectively, and the assurance of team members' comfortability with the solutions raised. Consequently, the study rejected the null hypothesis that team negotiation does not significantly influence collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. The qualitative research validated these results as they showed that team negotiations were critical within AFOs. AFOs build collaborative relationships by negotiating with teams, one-to-one or many, placing themselves in the forefront as solution holders for complex social and environmental problems. In the collaboration, the teams contribute relevant resources and expertise that help in achieving impact at proportions not previously possible. This collaborative framework also helps shift corporate culture, leadership, and priorities to recognize the essential economic value in upholding a double bottom line of both profit and people. The research observed that only those Ashoka fellow teams with strong negotiation skills benefited from collaboration. The study concluded that team negotiation significantly influences collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa.

Recommendations

The study results revealed that team negotiation significantly influences collaborative value within Ashoka Fellows' Organizations in Africa. A critical phase of team negotiations is preparation. Negotiating teams should ensure that they know as much as possible about the other side of the negotiation. The teams' perception is vital in the negotiating team's preparedness as they should be aware of what is necessary at every stage of the negotiating process. When negotiating, the focus should be on looking for alternative ways of dealing with the problem before finding a solution that satisfies all members. The evaluation of options during team negotiations should be objective. At large, the negotiating teams should ensure that all members feel comfortable with the solution to the problem raised before making the steps to implement the solution.

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