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## PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM AS HUMAN SECURITY DIALOGUE OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

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### Abstract

**Purpose:** If human security as defined in the United Nations Development report of 1994, entails shifting the focus from the state security and its interests to the broadest sense of the security of ordinary people and their interests, then the sanctioning of Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate in peacekeeping missions in 1999, and the counter-terrorism efforts beginning 2005, through to the creation of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism in June 2017 by the General Assembly Resolution 71/291, this article purports that these expansions have deepened and widened the meaning of human security.

**Methodology:** The discussion of the three interdependent concepts has heavily relied on secondary data, to demonstrate that there has been an expanded interpretation of both PoC and counter-terrorism in policy and implementation.

**Findings:** This article argues that, with the shift from state security to individual security, and from traditional military approach to transformative anti-terrorism strategies, human security narrative has enormously expanded to include every aspect of human fears, needs and priorities.

**Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy:** For the union to be effective, it is recommended that all the three concepts should be grounded in human rights approaches, supported by organizational and inter-institution coherence and coordination.

**Keywords:** *Civilians, Counter- Terrorism, Dialogue*

## **1.0 The Conceptual Definition of Human Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.**

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly to mean the security of territory from external aggression. It also meant protection of national interests through foreign policy. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. However, UNDP (1994) grounded the notion of human security into realization that there were legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. In the final analysis, human security is a summation of many aspects that involve economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. In cumulative manner, human security as defined by UNDP, is not a concern with weapons but one that concerns itself with human life and dignity (UNDP 1994:22) in Gjorv 2018:223). In this regard, human security is defined beyond the confines of the state, as it primarily highlights the fears, needs and priorities of ordinary people in the forefront of security studies (Gjorv 2018:223).

The argument here is that the security and interests of the state can not necessarily coincide with the security and interest of the ordinary people. In fact, indicates that human security is concerned with how people experience security and insecurity (ibid:224). This implies that while traditional conception of security focused on the state, in practical terms, the state has never been the sole provider of security. In this case, the context in which human security discourse exists is prominently becoming wider than that of a state itself. But this does not mean physical security is ignored in its wider meaning. In fact, the physical aspect was reinforced through the 2005 UN World Summit that saw the declaration of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Bellamy (2018:236) summarized paragraphs 138 – 9 of the Declaration;

1. The responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement while,
2. The international community responsibility is to assist the state to fulfil its responsibility to protect especially,
3. In situations where a state is manifestly failing to protect its population from the four crimes, the international community's responsibility to take timely and decisive action through peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means and, if that fails, other more peaceful means in a manner consistent with Chapters VI, which deploys pacific measures, VII which triggers enforcement measures and VIII which promotes regional arrangements of the UN Charter.

## **2.0 Twenty Years Gone: Revisiting the Evolution of Protection of Civilians Agenda.**

The evolution of the PoC agenda follows a number of experiences by the United Nations peacekeeping operations to effectively protect civilians in the 1990s. Mass massacres in Rwandan genocide, Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia are classical examples that catalyzed the need to rethink peacekeeping operations with a new approach. At the close of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in 1999, through UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (UNSC 1999), protection of civilians in armed conflict was introduced as one of the critical thematic areas required to support the affected communities. This was to apply pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which for the first time authorized the UN Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, through

the UN peacekeepers to accord protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

By 2019, there were fourteen (14) active UN peacekeeping missions, of which eight (8) were operating under PoC mandate, sanctioned through thematic and country-specific UN Resolutions (International Peace Institute 2019). With expanded sanctioning of PoC in policy and practical implementation, this paper argues that PoC in armed conflict cannot be split from the general application of human security concept. This is because PoC is now understood as a concept that covers all measures that aim at limiting the effects of conflict on civilians in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and International Refugee Law. It encompasses physical protection, protection through dialogue and engagement, and the establishment of a protective environment, therefore defined as a ‘whole-of mission’ activity (International Peace Institute 2019:1).

For example, in her research, Adamczyk (2019:2) established that civilians were not simply being caught up in fighting. In many instances, they are being increasingly and directly targeted. The deliberate targeting of civilians witnessed in the last two decades indicated the need for further refining of the concept of PoC. Because it was narrowly understood, therefore unable to holistically address all sources of insecurity, especially those subdued in visible and direct violence. While this inadequacy was propagating, the number of armed conflicts around the world was growing substantially, from fewer than 30 non-international armed conflicts in 2001 to more than 70 in 2016 (International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC 2018). As such, PoC agenda has rapidly become more than the sum of military, police and civilian structures deployed in war zones. The new image calls for well-coordinated hybrid efforts in conflict setting, including development entities and their respective donors. Traditionalizing peacekeeping in conflict situations which are full of buttressed sources of insecurity, may just amount to endorsement of ineffective response for cosmetic public relations. Given the breadth of the activities it pursues and its role on the international stage, the UN is a natural actor to implement the comprehensive approach and pursue inclusivity in its broad efforts to support countries in conflict or post-conflict situations (International Peace Institute 2019:6). Since human security cannot be discussed in its latest form by mere pointing out the broadness embedded in its meaning, its effectiveness therefore lies in the accountability placed on the whole range of actors. In fact, PoC normative framework may be to no purpose if the UN Security Council is unwilling or unable to better utilize the accountability mechanisms at its disposal (Adamczyk 2019:8). For policy makers, this is huge indication that security issues in both conflict and peace times have taken a rainbow nature, as causes of insecurity in war zones have become more inter-weaved as they are in countries experiencing negative peace.

Further findings by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2018), indicate that only a third of today’s armed conflicts are between two belligerent parties; 44% are between three and nine different forces and 22% involve more than 10 different belligerents (ICRC 2018). By one estimate, more than 1,000 armed groups were active in Syria alone in 2014 (Carter Center 2015). The conduct of hostilities has also changed significantly over the past 20 years. Urban warfare and the growing use of explosive weapons in populated areas have substantially increased civilian harm and civilian casualties (UNSC 2017). Also, the research established that

urban warfare in Syria and Iraq resulted in eight times more civilian fatalities than other forms of armed conflict (ICRC, 2018). More than 90% of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons in populated areas are civilians (UNGA 2016). Civilians are also dying from the indirect effects of conflict, including lack of essential infrastructure, disease and famine.

The fusion of PoC into entire human security discourse, gives the leadership in the UN operations some leverage to respond to crises with a picture beyond country-specific concerns. Twenty years of its application in armed conflicts, is a demonstration that the PoC agenda is a resilient notion, not isolated from the mainstream security dialogue. In short, it has created policy and operational interconnectedness with other elements of human security. Of course, there are concerns that the expansion of PoC related issues may further fragment its meaning even in the wider understanding. The fears are that it may increase competition for space and bandwidth, and ultimately create fatigue around PoC substantive implementation (International Peace Institute 2017). Researchers like Adamczyk (2019:7) pessimistically argue that all-inclusive identification of vulnerabilities in armed conflict may lead to overlooking civilians whose threats are not neatly fitting into conflict-related categories. However, without stifling the raised concerns, this paper argues that what is convincingly at stake in this expansion is not its meaning, but its applicability in an integrated and coordinated manner.

As PoC is incredibly becoming complementary and intersectional under the new human security framework, institutional reconfiguration is needed to align it with the new conception. That is one of the avenues peacekeeping operations can apply to translate these normative growths in human security. They demonstrable advances in civilian protection practices (Humanitarian Policy Group 2019). Nonetheless, the use of new specific strategies depends on the particular context. For example, Barr (2010) claims that local views of security often differ from those of peace support and aid missions. The difference is seen in encompassing not just physical safety but also life-critical sustenance services. He contends that more civilians die in times of conflict from the collapse of sustenance and services than from weapons. Reflecting on this reality, civilians often take great physical risks to obtain access to such goods and services. Acknowledging that 'self-protection is not a panacea, identified aid agencies can be in the best position to promote and support local preparedness strategies. This means that while violence is the cause of insecurity, it is also the means to acquire security (Dexter 2018:209). She argues that the source of this insecurity that civilians experience has its route in the behavior of their own states. Even with this more critical approach to security understanding, violence also produce security through humanitarian intervention (Dexter 2018:209). The author however attempts to draw the line between legitimate violence and other types. Therefore, deploying peacekeepers as part of the PoC teams, constitutes waging legitimate violence to achieve stability and secure the lost human rights among civilian populations. The justification is that when violence is used in a right way, it brings positive change such as peacekeepers with PoC mandate.

As observed by German philosopher Fredrick Engels (1845), social relations can also be a form of violence, highlighting the argument that human suffering is not always associated with deliberate act of identifiable agent of aggression. Engels argument is reinforced by Johan Galtung's work in (Dexter 2018:210) which indicates that violence is context specific through what he termed structural violence. In this regard, violence is brewed whenever the person's

bodily or mental potential is limited in a way that could be preventable. For peacekeeping operations, the focus is on preventing what is supposed to be prevented under the United Nations Charter. As violent conflict is associated with both direct and structural violence, deploying peacekeepers, police and civilian staff, aims at protecting civilian populations against a wide spectrum of violence (Dexter 2018). The identifiable aggressors such the state and non-state actors, create direct violence while structural layout of the affected communities are the drivers of structural violence whose actors may not easily be identifiable. For example, the failure by the state to create employment, provide health and education services etc, may create some level of violence that may submerge in the grand acts of the aggrieved and the oppressors. This explains why peacekeeping operations are multi-dimensional, multilayered and involving a wide spectrum of responders to the crisis.

Along with security stabilization actors such as peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies, other actors pay attention to poverty, diseases, social exclusion, hunger, all key elements of human security. Dexter (2018:219) contends that achieving lasting progressive change can – and is more likely to come about through non-violent methods. Such arguments have widened and deepened the study of human security. Taking its broad definition, human security is a concept universally applicable, both in peaceful and war-like countries. It is therefore sensibly applicable even in armed conflicts. The distinction between direct and structural violence continues to diminish with the advent of cross-application of human security. In fact, all-encompassing institutional approach to PoC is what works. This implies that apart from physical violence experienced in conflict areas, millions of people around the world are in conflict – like situation that threaten their very existence. Even as refugees seek asylum in other countries, their post-conflict reintegration depends also on the efforts applied to alleviate the suffering of those that did not flee the fog of violence. The United Nations peacekeeping operations are therefore not only engaged in quenching direct violence but dealing with structural conditions that produce individualized and generalized violence.

The former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (2014) once suggested that;

*peace cannot be decreed solely through treaties – it should be nurtured through the dignity, rights and capacities of every man and woman. It is a way of being, of interacting with others, of living on this planet. Peace means access to education, health and essential services – especially for girls and women. It means giving every young woman and man the chance to live as they choose. It means developing sustainably and protecting the planets biodiversity. More than ever, it means living with others on the basis of tolerance, respect and mutual understanding’ (Dexter 2018:212).* The definition of peace has indicated that signing of Peace Agreements by warring parties does not always guarantee peace. Violence is a product of multifaceted and complex interlocking social, economic, environmental and political factors. For example, despite the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in June 2015, Mali has continued witnessing high levels of violence (Dexter 2018:212). This is an indication that the drivers of conflict are not symbiotically neutralized by the signing of Peace Agreements.

As such, peacekeeping missions have so been reconfigured in many forms to respond to these variegated fears and interests weaved into state structures and everyday lives of ordinary people.

The structural division of labour seen in peacekeeping operations are reflective of the context-specific response to the assessed insecurity and their impact on the lives of ordinary people. When the state falls short of the required commitment to honor the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it illuminates the crumbling societal order in many aspects. Humanitarian intervention for PoC is mounted as a response in the face of other initiatives failing to restore orderly functioning of the state.

Despite lacking solid theoretical understanding, the concept of human security provides peacekeepers with a framework for discussing their work beyond the context of military approaches. It permits the development of a PoC strategy based on intersections of conflictual ethnic, health, education, social exclusion, environmental, food aspects etc, that potentially trigger insecurity in complex emergencies. In this case, for those civilians trapped in the mist of armed conflicts, the aspect of widening the practice of PoC remains more beneficial to them. This is because their physical threats are just an additional precarious dimension of what other civilians in peaceful countries are experiencing, except the later experience it through structural conditions. Failure by states to contain or prevent armed conflicts, automatically presents the imminent threat to their citizens. They depend on international community when their internal protection mechanisms are no longer a viable option. As human security puts emphasis on the security of the individual as opposed to the state, peacekeeping missions put protection of the most vulnerable segments of society as critical to its mandate. By identifying the needs of those who are least secure or marginalized, security is reoriented away from the state interests to them (Hilhorst 2003 in Gjorv 2008:232).

From the text in the paragraphs above, states have an obligation to protect their populations from serious crimes or mass atrocities. This was reaffirmed by the UN Security Council through Resolution 1674 in 2006, in which it positioned itself to act in response to mass crimes (Bellamy 2018:237). By 2017, the Security Council had reaffirmed the principle of R2P six times, and continued incorporating it in its operational mandates in reference to crises in Central Africa Republic, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Mali, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen etc. The principle has also been used in UN General Assembly Resolutions, Human Rights Council, the UN Secretary General's reports, including the establishment of a Joint Office for Genocide Prevention and R2P. Accordingly, this office was established for early warning, crafting of response action and developing system-wide approach (Bellamy 2018:237). Coming from the traditional understanding of sovereignty, and the sanctioning of R2P, many states continued to violate the rights of their people.

However, in 1999 former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that state sovereignty, in its basic sense, was being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation (Bellamy 2018:239). In addition, Francis Deng and his co-authors argued that *sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not only to their own national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its national sovereignty* (Deng et al. 1996:1 in Bellamy 2018:239). In this regard, protection of national sovereignty is constituted in the realm of good governance. Any leadership that falls short of democratic governance through grave

human rights violations, is visited with external force through humanitarian intervention. In 1999, Kofi Annan indicated that *the state was now widely understood to be the servant of the people and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty – and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual as enshrined in our Charter – has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her own destiny* (Annan:1999 in Bellamy 2018:239). These declarations offered the United Nations and the international community in general, the impetus to conceive security in the widest sense of human rights violations. The bigger picture on PoC in armed conflicts is that, physical violence and conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) are dominantly a big challenge facing thousands of civilians. It is also crucial to know a civilian person in conflict context, as any unarmed person who is not, or is no longer, directly participating in hostilities. In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals trapped in this doubt shall be considered civilian and afforded the protections owed to civilians until determined otherwise.

In this sense, protection has three main dimensions; physical protection, rights based approach, and stabilization and peacebuilding. Physical protection is quite visible as it implies protecting civilians from killings, torture, rape etc. In the face of transcending the physical security needs, human rights based community PoC is prominently taking shape in the recent years. For instance, peacekeepers and other components of the UN, work with various communities through their representatives, men, women, youth, boys and girls etc, to determine priority areas of support. There are advantages accrued in this approach as it provides better perspectives of the prevailing situation and priorities. Ultimately, a tailor made response is developed out of this understanding of the situation. Along with the general situational awareness, special attention is also paid to local gender dynamics, mainly through female peacekeepers for effective reciprocal communication with local women and girls. This enhances opportunities for information gathering as protection substance for women and girls who are largest segment of the affected communities.

If not appropriately protected, women and girls experience some conflict backlash, such as exclusion from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support packages and other post-conflict reconstruction support activities. Sometimes, they continue to receive conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) even after the major conflict has been terminated. Special attention is also extended to children who are prone to conscriptions into armed groups as child soldiers, forced laborers and sexually abused. However, Breakey (2012:42) argued that PoC through peacekeeping was still being conducted as a matter of principle, and not concretized into a norm. As such violence against civilians continues to rise, including the use of explosive devices in urban areas, sexual violence as a weapon of war and direct or systematic targeting of people along ethnic or religious lines (Ross et al 2016:9). In today's armed conflicts, almost all of those killed, injured or harmed are civilians, a pattern similar to deaths caused through terrorist attacks.

### **3.0 Counter-Terrorism: Tackling New Forms of Conflict or Institutionalizing the Fight?**

In order to have a clear picture of the history of the international counter-terrorism regime, the paper's preamble on this aspect is heavily dependent on the works of Smith Mike, who in 2011 was the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director of the Counter-



Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. In his grand write up titled ‘Securing our Future: A Decade of Counter-terrorism Strategies’, Mike argued while terrorism did not start with the 9/11 attack on the USA which left almost three thousand people dead, the incident changed the world due to wide spread impact. The impact of the attack ‘converged’ the world on the universal values of peace, equality, tolerance, and dignity for all people in the world. Prior to these events, the United Nations had come up with a global framework on terrorism. It was an approach that brought the international community together and established a legal framework that enabled states to fight the threat collectively, especially by focusing on its diverse characteristics of hijacking of planes, taking of hostages, financing of terrorism, making of explosives, and the threat of nuclear terrorism. As QI-Qaeda operational bases were fragmenting, autonomous terrorist groups emerging within Western societies became the biggest threats (Anderson 2010: 21). Also, following the coordinated bombing of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, there was coordinated squeezing of the operational space of the Taliban and later the Al-Qaeda.

Realizing that terrorism was unfolding as one of the ruthless threats to international peace and security in the new millennium, the UN Security Council came out aggressively by calling upon all UN Member States, separately and collectively, to deny terrorists any safe haven in their respective countries. Also illicit financial support was curtailed while cooperating in bringing culprits to justice. There was also increasing attention to adopt preventive measures, especially noting that extremists were using the Internet to recruit people and incite terrorist acts. As these efforts continued creating synergies among its Member States, the UN emphasized that counter-terrorism measures should be in line with states' international legal obligations, including human rights law. Another measure was to ensure that non-state actors, should not have access to weapons of mass destruction. In brief, counter-terrorism strategy has two areas to focus on; reducing the causes of terrorism, and dealing with its effects (Anderson 2010:27)

In order to achieve coherence and effectiveness in the anti-terrorism fight, in 2006, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/general-assembly/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy/>).

This was the first institutionalized move to conceive terrorism as a problem created and thriving in social, economic and political environments. The strategy was meant to look at unresolved conflicts, issues relating dehumanization of victims, discrimination, violations of human rights, and lack of good governance, as factors brewing conditions for terrorism to flourish. In practice, UN Member States were required to securing their borders, tightening financial controls, strengthening the role of the police, improving criminal justice systems, and providing mutual legal assistance to other countries trying to convict terrorists in their courts. It also meant ratifying relevant Conventions and localizing the enacting of terrorism laws. In June 2017, the UN General Assembly sanctioned the creation of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism - UNOCT. The establishment of UNOCT was seen as the bedrock of the UN mandate on counter-terrorism that brings also all UN components together in a coordinated way, each bringing their unique contribution.

Research has shown that states are deeply involved in the emergence and logic of armed groups, therefore involving them in counter-terrorism increases effectiveness in fighting the vice. It is ‘within state institutions that the core skills needed for armed rebellion are transmitted (Jairo and

Jonathan 2015:11). In other words, capacities built by states enhance the likelihood of armed non-state actors forming (Jairo and Jonathan 2015:11). This means that capacities built by the States for peace and development can easily be hi-jacked by terrorists for violence purposes. By implication, the very means to counter violent extremism become the basis of nourishing future formations of armed non- state actors. These groups model their existence with state symbols associated with nation states, such as flags, currency and national anthems (Jairo and Jonathan 2015:120). It explains their capacity to foster cohesion and acceptance within terrorist camps. In fact, they become de facto security providers with control of territory and populations achieved (Podder 2013). Where a state as an entity that should command a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory fails to do, supply of protection to civilians becomes very limited. Instead, the security vacuum is quickly replaced with increased control of territories by terrorists.

They claim the take-over is meant to protect vulnerable populations in the face of a failing state. Their activities tend to become legitimate in the eyes of those vulnerable populations, seeking urgent refill of security vacuum created by state inability. Terrorist groups assume state-like roles such as Boko Haram in North East Nigeria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. What we see, is that the use of force is no longer retained in the domain of the state, a contradiction to the provisions of the international law, which is state-centric on the legitimate use of force. This competitive control of the state, goes down to control populations, despite its legitimacy. By default, control of a particular area, is control of the populations. It reflects emerging dynamic relationship between armed actors and the populations during irregular conflicts (Jairo and Jonathan 2015:14). In areas infested with terrorism and regular conflict, the existing dynamic aggregate of multiple conflicts of different natures under the control of both visible and invisible players, therefore puts PoC an urgent priority for peacekeepers and anti-terrorist actors.

As has already been demonstrated, in times of security instability, PoC and counter-terrorism are the two major methods that the United Nations, working with its Member States, is using to create conditions necessary for enjoyment of human rights. Counter-terrorism approaches draw strength from the IHL and other instruments that prescribe how civilians should be protected from attacks. Meanwhile, the traditional UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) recognized ‘protection of civilians’ as a humanitarian and military function. This implies that the dynamic relationship between peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts, which previously was almost incompatible due to principles of impartiality is now fading. Few years ago, counter-terrorism response was always characterized by military functions only. But the spread of terrorism in the recent years, the use of militarized responses, combined with other anti-terrorist efforts is becoming common. They are deployed jointly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as well as the use of counterterrorist forces. The 2015 UN policy on PoC also emphasizes the need to pursue it through a comprehensive approach to complement the work of the three components of the mission (peacekeepers, police, civilians) as well as the UN country team. Holistic approach exploits the comparative advantages of the multiplicity of actors that contribute to providing protection of civilians, and analyze the optimal positioning and appropriate modes of engagement of the mission vis-à-vis local, national, sub-regional and international protection actors (UN 2015). Classic examples can be seen in the Sahel, Somalia, and Lake Chad Basin.

After all, the UN Action for Peacekeeping Initiative (A4P) emphasizes partnerships. But according to (Charbonneau 2018) the new partnerships has generated questions; how UN peacekeepers can operate in environments where counterterrorist forces are also deployed, how UN missions can demarcate their responsibilities from that of counterterrorist objectives, and how UN peacekeeping can cooperate with regional organizations or coalitions of states that do counterterrorism. Despite some notable challenges on the division of labour, the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a good example where legitimate political actors are working side by side with the French-led counterterrorist troops and the development actors. This is premised on the ability to distinguish and, most importantly, on the authority to make the distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist actors, and between the spheres of terrorist activity and of legitimate war or peace politics (ibid). There are several rationales for and factors behind the push for more coordination and integration at all levels. In terms of ensuring that POC is effective, coordinating efforts among the wide variety of protection actors maximizes the impact and capacity of each to prevent and respond to threats to civilians. From an organizational perspective, budget cuts, reduction of troops, and peacekeeping transitions incentivize the Secretariat to consider integrated and comprehensive approaches. From a political perspective, a stronger focus on prevention and political strategies and solutions has reinforced the role of unarmed civilian strategies in complementing military efforts. From an operational point of view, hostile and non-permissive environments have reduced the space for peacebuilding and humanitarian actors and pushed them to work together more closely for security, access and logistical reasons (International Peace Institute 2019: 8).

Sometimes, the multiplicity of the conflict actors, their identities and relationships among themselves and with the on-going conflict, problematizes the joint efforts. For example, terrorist groups in Mali and the Sahel are embedded in local political and governance dynamics, which at occasionally confers them with political legitimacy (op cit). They find support in criticizing the government over bad governance and lack of justice. These two elements have been pointed across in terrorism, political uprising and ineffective protection of civilian's discourse. What this means, is that more work is required to create an effective union between protection of civilians under peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism actors. It has to be done through well-defined delineation of roles and responsibilities. This paper argues that any fragmented union between peacekeepers and anti-terrorist players, produce far reaching consequences on civilians whose demands for effective protection are high. Sometimes, terrorists would also exploit the situation to aggravate the vulnerability of the two mandates; protection of civilians, and the counter-terrorism. The end result, would be failure of PoC and counter-terrorism mechanisms to effectively contribute to the cultivation of a protective environment within the wider human security discourse.

However, long time questions of whether or not the purpose of peacekeepers can actually be complemented with those of counter-terrorism still exists. The answer is that the two entities are deployed for the same purposes, achieved by using different approaches. To support the necessity of counter-terrorism, in 1998, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 'sometimes peace has to be made or enforced before it is kept'. The world has therefore acknowledged the new security environment involving terrorism and violent extremism, demanding that

peacekeeping and anti-terrorist forces can now work in partnership. This is important especially in the era where military approach alone and its chances to eliminate sources of complex political emergencies and terrorism are very minimal. The significant role of human security discourse in global development agenda since 1994, constitutes another reason why the union for protection of civilians cannot easily be divorced. As the world's agenda on counter-terrorism has substantially grown, amid thin lines between terrorism and other acts of violence, peacekeeping typology is likely to be rebranded to 'counter-terrorism peacekeeping'. This will be a means of authenticating the complex and emerging security environment. Protection of civilians also has a broad meaning under the concept of Responsibility to Protect, where it envisions the use of force as a last resort under a Security Council mandate. According to UN – World Bank partnership framework for crisis-affected situations of April 2017, building resilience of the most vulnerable people, reducing poverty, enhancing food security, promoting shared prosperity, and sustaining peace were very important elements of the framework. These measures were to be implemented in situations of high risk, or on-going conflicts, with high prevalence of forced displacements, in post conflict or post disaster situations requiring massive support, including climate change induced risks or disasters.

#### **4.0 Conclusion: Protection of Civilians and Counter-Terrorism - Twins Turning Triplets**

The article has discussed protection of civilians and counter-terrorism as two main approaches that have immensely contributed to the concept of human security. Human security has been defined as shifting the focus from the state security and its interests to the broadest sense of the security of ordinary people and their interests regardless of location and individual or group circumstances. Therefore, protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions contributes to the acquisition of broad security for ordinary people through a variety of tactics available. It covers all measures that aim at limiting the effects of conflict on civilians in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and International Refugee Law. While counter-terrorism is a strategy used by states to neutralize terrorists, their organizations and networks, the ultimate goal is to incapacitate terrorists against using violence to instill fear in governments and populations that would otherwise succumb to terrorist goals. In summary, the twin approaches of limiting the effects of conflict on civilians through PoC strategies and the neutralization of terrorists using holistic human rights-based approaches, have significantly expanded the human security narrative in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, thereby producing the triplet concepts for same goal. For the union to be effective, it is recommended that all the three concepts should be grounded in human rights approaches, supported by organizational and inter-institution coherence and coordination.

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